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The paper reviews the nature of current globalization and the  growing divergence in competitive 
performance in the developing world. It  considers  the case  for  industrial policy,  contrasting the 
neoliberal with the structuralist approach. It argues that there is a valid case for selective interventions in 
overcoming the  market  and institutional failures in building the capabilities  required for industrial 
development. It describes the strategies adopted by the Asian Tigers to build industrial competitiveness, 
and concludes with lessons for other developing countries. The kinds of industrial policy needed in the 
current setting are different from traditional industrialisation strategies, but globalization and technical 
change do not  eliminate the need for intervention. On the contrary, given path dependence, 
cumulativeness and agglomeration economies, they increase it. There is a need to reconsider the rules of 
the game constraining the exercise of industrial policy, and for international assistance in designing and 
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1. Introduction  
As liberalization and globalization gather pace, concern with  industrial  competitiveness is growing, not 
just in developing countries but also in mature industrial ones. But it is the  former that face the most 
intense competitive pressures: many find that their enterprises are unable to cope with  rigours of open 
markets – in exporting and in competing with imports – as they open their economies. Some countries are 
doing very well; the problem is that many are not. Diverging industrial competitiveness in the developing 
world is one of the basic causes of the growing disparities in income that are  now a pervasive feature of 
the world scene. The immense potential that globalization offers for industrial growth is being tapped by a 
relatively small number of countries, while liberalization is driving the wedge deeper.  
Much of  this is  widely  known. The Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations  were 
conceived to deal with just such concerns.  However, there is little consensus yet on what can be done to 
deal with them, particularly in the industrial sphere. What  can poor countries do to  strengthen their 
industrial competitiveness in the international economic setting? Should they persist with liberalization 
and hope that free market forces will stimulate growth and bring about greater convergence? Or is there a 
need to look again at national and international policy? What, in sum, is the correct role of government in 
stimulating industrialization and using it as an engine for growth and structural transformation?  
There are essentially two approaches to the issue of policy: neoliberal  and structuralist. The neoliberal 
approach is that the best strategy for all  countries and in all situations is to liberalize – and not do much 
else. Integration into the international economy, with resource allocation driven by  free markets, will  let 
them realise their ‘natural’ comparative advantage. This will in turn optimize dynamic advantage and so 
yield the highest rate of sustainable growth attainable – no government intervention can improve upon 
this but will only serve to  reduce welfare. In this approach, the only  legitimate role for the  state  is to 
provide a stable macro-economy with clear rules of the game, open the economy fully  to  international 
product and factor flows,  give a lead role to  private enterprise, and  furnish essential p ublic goods like 
basic human capital and  infrastructure. This approach has the backing of the industrialized countries and 
the Bretton Woods institutions (which is why it is also referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’). It has 
become enshrined in the new rules of the game being formulated and implemented by the WTO.  
The neoliberal approach has strong theoretical premises: markets are ‘efficient’, the institutions needed to 
make markets work exist and  are effective, and  if there are  deviations from optimality  they cannot be 
remedied effectively by  governments. The premises are a mixture of theoretical, empirical and political 
assumptions. Their theoretical core relies, among other things, on a restrictive view of the technological 
basis of competitiveness. The empirical  one relies on a particular interpretation of the experience of the 
most successful industrializing economies, the ‘Tigers’ of East Asia. The political  element  –  that 
governments are necessarily and universally less efficient than markets – has less to do with economics 
than with ideology.  
The structuralist view puts less faith in free markets as the driver of dynamic competitiveness and more in 
the ability of governments to mount interventions effectively. It questions the theoretical and empirical 
basis for the argument that untrammelled market forces account for the industrial success of the East 
Asian Tigers (or, indeed, of the earlier industrialization of the presently  rich countries). Accepting the 
mistakes of past industrialization  strategies and the need for  greater openness, it  argues that  greater 
reliance on markets does not pre-empt a proactive role for the government. Markets are powerful forces 
but they are not perfect; the institutions needed to make them work efficiently are often weak or absent. 
Government interventions are needed to improve on market outcomes.  
Structuralists also accept that some industrialization policies  have not worked well  in the past. To the 
neoliberals this is a reason for denying any role for proactive policy both in  past success and in future 
strategy: if there are market failures, the costs are always less than  those of government failures. The 
structuralists, on the other hand, see a vital role for policy in industrial success. For them, therefore, past QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 3 
 
   
policy failure is not a reason for passive reliance on  deficient markets but for  improving government 
capabilities. They note that many poor regions that have implemented neoliberal policies recently  have 
not experienced the industrial growth or export success that characterized more interventionist economies. 
To them, a projection of current trends suggests that persisting with passive liberalization in the context of 
globalization will exacerbate rather than reverse divergence. 
The growing unease with the consequences of neoliberalism led the Zedillo Commission, in its ‘Report of 
the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development’ to the Monterrey  Conference on  Financing for 
Development in 2002, to phrase the issue in diplomatic terms. Noting that ‘Sadly, increasing polarization 
between the haves and have-nots has become a feature of our world’ it said the following on infant 
industry protection (a policy tool banned under the new rules):  
“However misguided the old model of blanket protection intended to nurture import substitute industries, 
it would be a mistake to go to the other extreme and deny developing countries the opportunity of actively 
nurturing the development of an industrial sector” (Zedillo Commission, 2001, Executive Summary, p. 9-
10).
2    
The controversy on  industrial policy, of course, is not new; it goes back decades and, in earlier guises, 
centuries (Reinert, 1995, Chang, 2002). Despite the frequent assertion one hears that the debate is now 
dead and the efficacy of free markets established beyond doubt, this is not the case. This paper shows why 
this is the case and suggests that the case for policy remains strong, and is in fact becoming stronger with 
technical change and  globalization. However,  the kinds of intervention needed  are  changing; as a 
structural force, globalization reduces the feasibility of some strategies while increasing that of others.  
Structural changes are supported by new ‘rules of the game’ on participation in the international system. 
Some rules are necessary to facilitate the changes, but they must take account of the fact that the field has 
players of very different strengths. Imposing a level field can lead to an uneven distribution of benefits 
between  the strong  and  the weak.  They  can  constrain  the ability of p oorer countries to  build the 
capabilities they need for  industrialization, banning policies used with  spectacular success by  several 
countries, including the advanced ones. Before coming to the new rules and the legitimate role of policy, 
let us review briefly the main features of recent industrialization. 
2. The new dimensions of industrial competitiveness 
2.1 Structural features 
Competitiveness has always mattered for industrial growth, but its nature has evolved. Rapid technical 
change, shrinking economic distance, new forms of industrial organization, tighter links between national 
value chains and widespread policy liberalization, are altering radically the nature of environment facing 
enterprises. Competition now arises with great intensity from practically anywhere in the world, based on 
a bewildering array of new technologies, advanced skills and sophisticated supply-chain and distribution 
techniques. To survive it,  all producers  must  use  new  technologies at or near ‘best practice’.  It  is 
organised in complex systems spanning many countries, tapping differences in costs, skills, resources and 
tastes to optimize the efficiency of the entire system (Radosevic, 1999). It is supported by international 
brands and networks with the capacity to deliver  vast a mounts of  information  at negligible cost. 
Manufacturing  is becoming more information-intensive:  larger parts of value added consist of 
‘weightless’ activities like research, design, marketing and networking.  
Technical  change is shifting industrial and trade structures  towards  more complex,  technology-based 
activities. Table 1 shows the growth of manufacturing value added (MVA) for three technological sets of 
activities: resource based (RB), low technology  (LT) and medium and  high technology (MHT).
3 For 
                                                  
2 For an interchange based on this recommendation see Wood (ed.) (2003).  Rodrik (2001) raises similar issues.  
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exports the data allow us to show high technology products separately. Over the past two decades exports 
have grown faster than production, and  complex  activities have grown faster than other branches of 
manufacturing. Developing countries have done better in all branches than industrialized economies.  
Table 1: Growth of manufacturing value added and manufactured exports by technology (% per annum, 1980-2000) 
Activity  World  Industrialized 
countries 
Developing countries 
Manufacturing value added 
Total MVA   2.6%  2.3%  5.4% 
RB MVA   2.3%  1.8%  4.5% 
LT MVA   1.7%  1.4%  3.5% 




7.6%  6.6%  12.0% 
RB manufactured 
exports  
5.6%  5.2%  6.7% 
LT manufactured 
exports  
7.4%  8.4%  11.4% 
MHT manufactured 
exports  
8.4%  7.3%  16.5% 
    o/w Hi-tech exports   11.5%  9.9%  20.2% 
Source: Calculated from UNIDO and Comtrade data.  
Organizational  structures and  the location  of production  are changing in response to technical change. 
Industrial  firms  are  becoming  less vertically integrated and  more specialized  by technology. Under 
competitive pressure, they are scouring the world for more economical  locations. Technical progress in 
transport and communications is shrinking economic space and  allowing  firms to locate p rocesses and 
functions in far-flung parts of the globe. Some facilities are under the control of transnationals from the 
industrialized countries but others  are independent local firms, interwoven with the leaders in intricate 
webs of contractual and non-contractual relations.  This  'fragmentation' of production is rewriting the 
geography of industrial activity.
4  
                                                  
4 The international fragmentation of value chains has, for economic reasons, gone furthest in activities with discrete and 
separable production processes and high value products. Electronics is the best example, placing production in several countries, 
each site specializing in a process or function according to its labour costs, skills, logistics and so on (Sturgeon, 2002). The QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 5 
 
   
New technologies change the institutional  and policy structures needed for competitiveness. For instance, 
countries require new skills to manage technical change, and  so the institutional ability to upgrade skills 
(Narula, 2003).  They need good technical  support agencies  in  standards, metrology, quality, testing, 
R&D, productivity and  SME  extension.  They need advanced infrastructure  in information a nd 
communication technologies (ICTs).  They need new rules, legal systems and  agencies  to  encourage 
enterprises to build competitive capabilities and allow knowledge to flow across national boundaries. And 
they need to cushion the impact of new technologi es on declining activities and disadvantaged groups. It 
is not easy to meet such demands, even  in advanced countries – this is why most governments mount 
competitiveness strategies (Lall, 2001.b).  
Globalization also leads to greater transfer of productive factors across economies. However, though 
capital, technology, information  and  skills are more m obile they do  not spread evenly  over  low wage 
locations. They go  only to places where competitive production is possible, to locations that can supply 
the inputs and institutions needed to complement the mobile factors. It requires, in brief, the development 
of new industrial capabilities (Best, 2001). Cheap unskilled labour or raw natural resources are no longer 
sufficient to sustain industrial growth: it is strong local capabilities that determine competitive success. 
Even 'simple' entry-level industrial activities like clothing, footwear or food processing require 
sophisticated capabilities if they are to face global competition.  
However, industrial capabilities develop slowly,  in a cumulative and path-dependent manner subject to 
agglomeration economies. Thus,  those economies that launch on to a virtuous circle of growth, 
competitiveness and investment in new capabilities can carry on doing better than those that are stuck in a 
‘low level equilibrium’ and cannot muster the resources to break out. Industrial performance can diverge 
across countries and continue diverging  over time, with no inbuilt forces to return them towards greater 
convergence. Reversing these trends is not easy. It calls for concerted policy action to shift economies 
from one growth (or rather, low growth) and technological trajectory to another.  
2.2 Rules of the game  
Liberalization  in the developing world  has been partly voluntary,  partly driven by  persuasion and 
pressures and partly enforced by changes to the rules of international economic relations. The changes 
have essentially  been to  free trade and capital flows from government interventions, strengthen private 
property rights and level  the  playing field for all economic agents. Supporting these new rules are a 
number of such domestic policy 'reforms' as liberalization of financial markets and privatization of public 
enterprises. Some of these changes were initiated by developing countries disillusioned with early import-
substitution industrialization strategies. Some were initiated by developed countries, the Bretton Woods 
agencies, and various bilateral, regional and international agreements. And some were negotiated at the 
international level, as in the Uruguay Round of GATT (now WTO).  
One effect of these changes has been to constrict policies used to promote industrial development. The 
most affected are: protection of infant industries,
5 performance requirements on foreign investors, export 
                                                                                                                                                                  
segmentation of software, business process services and other IT based activities like call centres is another manifestation of this 
phenomenon outside manufacturing. Fragmentation goes beyond the spread of transnational companies (TNCs). I t encompasses 
the closer integration of national value chains under several governance systems, with direct ownership by TNCs being at one 
end and loose buying relationships at the other (Gereffi et al., 2001, Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). 
5 No new protection can be offered to products for which members have ‘bound’ their tariffs, though if actual tariffs are lower 
than bound tariffs they can be raised. Export processing zones may come under the purview of the subsidies ban in the future 
(LDCs are exempt so far). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 6 
 
   
targeting and  incentives and  other  subsidies affecting trade,
6  slack IPRs (intellectual property rights) 
protection to promote copying and reverse engineering and local content rules
7.  
The rules are too complex to be analysed here at length and their precise content is not germane to the 
discussion, but some general points  may  be noted. First, the rules  on trade  allow for  exceptions, 
particularly for the least developed countries. However, the grace period allowed is coming to an end for 
many exceptions. Second, the rules carry the threat of sanctions: interventions that affect trade can lead 
trading partners to impose compensatory tariff or other measures. Third, more important than the specific 
measures undertaken till now  is the underlying  long-term trend towards greater liberalization. The scope 
and coverage of the rules are steadily increasing, and pressures for removal of policy controls are coming 
in many forms. It would be reasonable to project a trade regime for developing countries very similar to 
that obtaining within the OECD.  
Policies on FDI and technology imports have undergone rapid liberalization, to a greater extent than those 
on trade and domestic credit. Most liberalization has occurred over the past decade or so, particularly for 
FDI in the industrial sector, with the pace accelerating in the 1990s. Many of the latest changes are under 
international commitments under the Uruguay Round; however, the trend reflects a change of attitude on 
the part of host countries. There are practically no policy controls left on technology transfer, in contrast 
to the 1970s when there were extensive interventions by governments on licensing.  
Some of the main issues in the multilateral agreements are as follows:
8  
Services: The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers the supply of markets by foreign 
firms present in those markets under WTO. Its general principles are transparency and most-favoured-
nation (MFN) treatment (i.e. non-discrimination between firms of different origins). The GATS allows a 
‘positive list’ of permitted investments, allowing host countries freedom to exclude activities not in the 
list.  
Performance requirements on TNCs: This is treated under the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs). TRIMs affect trade in goods and are important in that they prohibit tools traditionally 
widely used to extract greater benefits from FDI: local content requirements, trade balancing (extremely 
effective in promoting the restructuring of the Latin American automobile industry), technology transfer, 
local employment and R&D, and so on.  
Intellectual property rights (IPRs): The protection of IPRs has moved in effect from the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation to WTO, under the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 
Agreement. It specifies rules on standards for protecting IPRs, domestic enforcement and international 
dispute settlement (UNCTAD, 1996). The most important point about the shift from WIPO to WTO is 
that trade sanctions can now be applied to countries deemed to be deficient protecting IPRs.
9 The 
implications for the developing world are worrying (Lall, 2003). While stronger IPRs may benefit the 
leading innovators in the developed countries, they can inhibit technological development in developing 
ones. They can raise the cost of formal technology transfers, by allowing technology sellers to impose 
stricter restrictions and by preventing copying and ‘reverse engineering’, the source of much 
technological learning in newly industrialising countries.  
                                                  
6 General subsidies that do not create a cost advantage for identifiable activities may not be actionable. Only subsidies given 
to particular activities or locations that create such an advantage are subject to potential sanctions.  
7 Local content rules are actionable if there are specific subsidies or incentives linked to achieving the prescribed levels. All 
countries, regardless of income levels, are now subject to this restriction.  
8 For a comprehensive analysis see UNCTAD (2003). 
9 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties may also affect traditional means of supporting technological 
activity by subsidies. Although the Agreement excludes ‘fundamental research’ from its actionable provisions (i.e. governments 
may still subsidize research), the text leaves scope for interpreting what the limits of this are. In any case, R&D now comes under 
WTO scrutiny, and subsidies for research deemed non-fundamental could be limited in the future. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 7 
 
   
2.3 Trends in industrial competitiveness in the developing world  
This section  uses  two  indicators:  world market shares in  manufacturing value added (MVA) and  in 
manufactured  exports. Developing r egions are  as follows:  ‘East  Asia’  or EA  includes C hina and all 
countries in the Southeast Asian region apart from Japan, while  EA2 excludes China.  ‘LAC’ (Latin 
America and the Caribbean) includes Mexico and LAC 2 excludes it. South Asia includes the five main 
countries in that region. ‘MENA’ (Middle East and North Africa) includes Turkey but not Israel (an 
industrialized country). ‘SSA’ (Sub-Saharan Africa) includes S. Africa except in SSA 2. 






































MVA: The developing world performed well in 1980-2000. Its share of global MVA rose by 10 
percentage points (from 14% to 24%) and its annual rate of growth (5.4%) was over twice the 2.3% 
recorded by the industrialized world. Since this was a period of trade expansion, globalized production 
and liberalization, it may seem that globalisation and liberalization were conducive to development. This 
is not so. Success in the developing world was very concentrated (Figure 1). East Asia dominated, raising 
its world share from around 4% to nearly 14% – exactly the 10 point rise for the developing world as a 
whole. It came  from behind LAC in 1980 to account for over two and a half times its share by  2000 
(Figure 2). Note that EA, while strongly export-oriented, was not 'liberal' in the Washington consensus 
sense.
10 LAC, the region that liberalized the most, the earliest and the fastest, was the worst performer.  
                                                  
10 As is now well known, most East Asian economies used infant industry protection, export subsidies and targets, credit 
allocation and direction, local content rules and so on to build their base of industrial capabilities, disciplining the process by 
strong export orientation (Amsden, 1989, Stiglitz, 1996, Wade, 1990, Westphal, 2002, World Bank, 1993). There were different 
strategies within this general approach. The leading Tiger economies like Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province 
of China invested massively in human capital (particularly technical skills), fostered local R&D and built strong support 
institutions (Lall, 1996 and 2001.a). They tapped FDI in different ways, Singapore by plugging into global production systems 
and the other two by drawing on its technologies via arm’s length means like licensing, copying and original equipment 
manufacturing. The second wave of Tiger economies like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines relied more heavily on 
FDI in export processing enclaves and less on building indigenous capabilities; their export success was thus largely driven by 
global value chains, particularly in electronics. China has a blend of different strategies, some similar to its neighbours and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 8 
 
   
Figure 2: Changes in shares of global MVA (% points)








LAC  and East  Asia illustrate the central issues of this paper nicely. The regions  had  very different 
approaches to industrialization, initially to develop industry
11 and later to liberalize it
12 – EA has had much 
more strategic industrial policy than LAC. The resulting differences in  outcomes are interesting, as the 
next two charts show. The charts separate China in EA and Mexico in LAC, both regional outliers, China 
because of its size, competitiveness and strong state role, Mexico because of its location and  privileged 
access to the US market. Both have done very well in manufactured exports with a strong role for FDI, 
but their differences are also of interest. For instance, the link between export and MVA growth  is far 
stronger in China than in Mexico: China is far less exposed to import competition and has used industrial 
                                                                                                                                                                  
others, like public enterprise restructuring, uniquely its own (Lall and Albaladejo, 2003). The region as a whole liberalized 
cautiously and has retained a significant role for the state. As Stiglitz says in a special contribution to the new Human 
Development Report, “China and other East Asian economies have not followed the Washington consensus. They were slow to 
remove tariff barriers, and China still has not fully liberalised its capital account. Though the countries of East Asia ‘globalized’, 
they used industrial and trade policies to promote exports and global technology transfers, against the advice of the international 
economic institutions” (UNDP, 2003, p. 80). Also see Rodrik (2001). 
11 In the first phase, LAC, in common with most other developing regions, relied heavily on protected import-substitution, 
sheltering enterprises from international competition but failing to offset this with incentives or pressures to export. It did little to 
attract export-oriented FDI (in EPZs) and so missed the surge in global production systems in electronics. It did not deepen local 
technological activity (by encouraging R&D) or develop the new skills needed for emerging technologies. In concert with 
widespread macroeconomic (and in some cases political) turbulence, this meant that LAC failed to develop a broad base of 
industrial capabilities that would drive competitiveness as it liberalized. As a comparatively high wage region,  LAC needed 
competitive advantages in complex activities to offset  labour cost disadvantage  vis a vis  Asia.  Despite  its  tradition of 
entrepreneurship and good initial base of skills, its industrial strategy failed to foster the necessary capabilities. There were 
exceptions, such as the automotive industry in the larger economies and resource-based activities more generally. But many such 
activities were not growing rapidly in world trade and, as shown below, LAC failed to increase its export market shares rapidly – 
the outstanding exception being Mexico, but due more to NAFTA privileges than to strategy. 
12 In the second (liberalization) phase, policy reform in LAC was rapid and sweeping, with no strategy to foster competitive 
capabilities and target promising activities. Again, there were exceptions, including the auto industry (restructured with the help 
of complementation programs, banned under new WTO rules), agro-based exports in Chile or national export ‘champions’ like 
Embraer in Brazil, but the general lack of strategy on industrial competitiveness meant that the region failed to catalyze export 
dynamism. Its main growth was in resource-based sectors where it was largely exploiting static comparative advantages Some 
other developing regions that also used import substitution strategies liberalized more slowly and carefully – India is a good 
example – and did better in terms of MVA growth (but almost as poorly in terms of export competitiveness).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 9 
 
   
policy to induce greater local content in its export activity.
13 Figure 3 shows MVA market shares within 
the developing world for EA without China, China, LAC without Mexico, and Mexico. 
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Figure 4 shows changes in these market shares over 1980-90 and 1990-2000. In 1980, LAC accounted for 
47% of developing world MVA and East Asia for 29%; two decades later, the shares were 22% and 58% 
respectively. The main surge in MVA growth in EA 2 (excluding China) was in the 1980s, with a slowing 
down in the 1990s  because  of the financial crisis and the global recession. In China the trends are 
reversed, with the more rapid growth in the 1990s, making its share of developing world MVA higher 
than the rest of East Asia together. LAC2, excluding Mexico, loses MVA shares more rapidly than 
Mexico, with the 1980s (the ‘lost decade’ after the debt crisis) being much worse than the 1990s.  
                                                  
13 China now poses a major competitive threat to Mexico in textiles and electronics. Mexican figures suggest the loss of over 
200,000 jobs to China since 2001. See The Economist (2003) and The International Herald Tribune (2003). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 10 
 
   
The  1990s are  illuminating for  LAC industrial  growth.  It started the decade with considerable slack 
engendered by the lost decade, which favourable macro and policy conditions should have allowed it to 
exploit for high production and export growth.  There was better macro management,  widespread 
privatization and lowering of trade barriers.  Despite these neoliberal  policies, the region continued to 
perform poorly: LAC2 had MVA growth of only 1.9% p.a., much lower than developing countries as a 
whole (6.4%) or East Asia (9.5%). It underperformed relative to  South Asia and  MENA, both highly 
interventionist  regions.  Mexico’s  more robust growth  of 4.4% was largely a consequence of trade 
privileges over other developing regions under NAFTA – hardly a neoliberal recipe. In any case it did not 
match EA 2 (6.7%) or China (13.1%), and this despite the fact that the 1990s were a bad period for EA2, 
reeling from the effects of the 1997 financial crisis.  
Export performance: Figure 5 shows world market shares for manufactured exports for 1981-2000 and the 
value of such exports in 2000, separating China from East Asia 2 and Mexico from LAC 2.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 11 
 
   
Figure 5: World market shares for manufactured products in 1981 & 2000, and values of manufactured 
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East Asia as a whole accounted for 18.4% of world manufactured exports in 2000, up from 6.8% in 1981. 
Within it, EA2 raised its share from 5.8% to 12.0% and China from 1.0% to 6.5%. China has a much 
higher share of regional MVA than exports – its industry, perhaps not surprisingly in view of the size of 
the economy and its late entry to export markets, is less export-oriented than its neighbours’. LAC lost QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 12 
 
   
world market share in 1981-90 (from 3.2% to 2.4%) then raised it over the next decade to 5.1%. The 
initial fall was due entirely to LAC 2 (from 2.7% to 1.9%), with Mexico holding steady at a 0.5% share. 
Over 1990-2000, LAC 2 raised its share marginally while Mexico had a dramatic six-fold increase to 
2.9%. As Figure 6 shows, other regions were relatively stagnant, though each did better in the 1990s than 
in the 1980s.  
What may we conclude from these data?  
MVA performance is broadly correlated with manufactured export performance, though the fit is not 
perfect. EA 2 and Mexico fare better in exports than in MVA in the 1990s, while the opposite is true of 
South Asia and MENA.  
Neither MVA nor export growth is strongly related to liberalization in the Washington consensus sense. 
China, in particular, is hardly a neoliberal paradigm.  
Industrial success remains concentrated. Liberalization is not leading to convergence, contradicting the 
neoliberal premise that liberalization per se would promote industrial growth and competitiveness.  
3. Why the world differs from the neoliberal ideal 
3.1 The neoclassical approach 
The reason why neoliberalism finds it difficult to analyse industrial development lies mainly in its 
treatment of  technology. Developing countries are thought not to undertake significant technological 
activity, since they do not innovate at the frontier. The neoclassical model assumes that there are no 
additional costs, risks or other constraints to using technologies. Thus, it does not raise any policy issues: 
by assumption there can be no significant market or institutional failure.
14 
Neoliberal economists accept that there is a role for the state, essentially to provide basic public goods 
(apart from law and order and a sound legal system and macro management). They also now accept that it 
has a role in providing non-selective or functional support for education, health and infrastructure. Why 
‘non-selective’? Selectivity (the support of particular activities, firms or technologies, or, crudely put, 
'picking w inners') became the arena for the industrial policy debate in the 1990s. The mid-1980s 
neoliberal interpretation of East Asian success, that it was due to free trade and other non-interventionist 
policies, was subjected to intense criticism. It was noted that most successful Asian industrialisers had 
been very interventionist in trade, FDI, technology transfer and domestic resource allocation.
15 The 
evidence was so overwhelming that the neoliberal camp was forced to admit the facts of the case.  
The reason why neoliberalism finds it difficult to analyse industrial development realistically lies in large 
part in its treatment of  technology. Technology is ignored in  most development  analysis. Developing 
countries are thought not to undertake significant technological activity, since they do not innovate at the 
frontier and rely primarily  on  imported  technologies. The neoclassical model assumes that there are no 
additional costs, risks or other constraints to using technologies. Thus, it does not raise any policy issues: 
by assumption there is no significant market or institutional failure.
16 
                                                  
14 This is as true of endogenous growth models – grounded in technical change – as it is of traditional models. Endogenous 
models focus on frontier innovation (the creation of new knowledge) rather than on using existing knowledge, and so simply 
assume that developing countries do best by opening themselves to inflows of information embodied in trade and investment. 
Access to new technology becomes equivalent to its effective use. The policy implications of the models that follow from 
externalities, increasing returns and non-appropriability in innovation apply only to advanced countries; the development 
implications, in so far as they are mentioned, are the same as in standard neoclassical analyses.   
15 The objections to the strong neoliberal position came from such authors as Amsden (1989), Lall (1992), Pack and Westphal 
(1986), Wade (1990) and Westphal (1982 and 1990).  
16 This is as true of endogenous growth models – grounded in technical change – as it is of traditional models. Endogenous 
models focus on frontier innovation (the creation of new knowledge) rather than on using existing knowledge, and so simply QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 13 
 
   
Neoliberal economists accept that there is a role for the state, essentially to provide basic public goods 
(apart from law and order and a sound legal system and macro management). They also now accept that it 
has a role in providing non-selective or functional  support for education, health and infrastructure. Why 
‘non-selective’? Selectivity (the support of particular activities, firms or technologies, or, crudely put, 
'picking winners')  became the  arena  for the industrial policy  debate  in the 1990s.  The  mid-1980s 
neoliberal interpretation of East Asian success, that it was due to free trade and other non-interventionist 
policies, was subjected to intense criticism. It was noted that most successful Asian industrializers had 
been  very interventionist in trade,  FDI, technology transfer and domestic resource allocation.
17  The 
evidence was so overwhelming that the neoliberal camp was forced to admit the facts of the case.  
However,  admitting that the most dynamic  economies had  ‘picked winners’ created difficulties for 
neoliberals, as the normal – and in this case valid – interpretation would be that performance and policy 
were causally related. They responded with a ‘moderate neoclassical’ stance (in contrast to the earlier 
‘strong neoclassical’ one  that assumed all markets to be efficient) that  devoted  enormous effort to 
explaining why selectivity, while it existed, had been redundant and unnecessary (World Bank, 1993).
18 
The moderate school admitted some  market failures and  some role for the state, but  only  as  long as 
interventions were functional  – it saw no valid role for policy in influencing allocation at the activity, firm 
or technological level . The ‘market friendly’ approach, as it was appealingly labelled, segmented market 
failures  not according to whether market failures existed but according to the level at which policies 
affected investment decisions.  
That neoclassical theory provides no reason for such a distinction – after all, if policy can correct a market 
failure it is justified  – was countered by a  political economy  premise,  that it was impossible for 
governments to mount effective selective  interventions.  The World Bank (1993) admitted that some 
selectivity may have worked in East Asia, but the circumstances had been unique. Other governments did 
not and could not have the kinds of capabilities needed, and so selectivity would do more harm than good. 
The moderate position, later  termed  the  ‘Washington consensus’,  happily coincided with the World 
Bank’s own operations (in health, education and infrastructure), policy advice (greater liberalization) and 
structural adjustment programmes (stabilization, liberalization and privatization).  
The moderate  position  retained the  simplifying assumptions  of the strong neoclassical position  on 
technology. Both used, implicitly or explicitly, the basic neoclassical model in which all markets affecting 
technology are ‘efficient’. In the theoretical sense, 'efficiency' has stringent requirements: product markets 
give the correct signals for investment and factor markets respond to these signals. At the firm level there 
are no scale economies or externalities. Firms have perfect information and foresight and full knowledge 
of all available technologies. They choose the right technology if faced with free market prices. Having 
selected the right  technology  they use it  instantaneously  at  ‘best practice’. There are no significant 
learning processes, no risks, no externalities and no deficienc ies in the skills, finance, information and 
infrastructure available to them.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
assume that developing countries do best by opening themselves to inflows of information embodied in trade and investment. 
Access to new technology becomes equivalent to its effective use. The policy implications of the models that follow from 
externalities, increasing returns and non-appropriability in innovation apply only to advanced countries; the development 
implications, in so far as they are mentioned, are the same as in standard neoclassical analyses.   
17 The objections to the strong neoliberal position came from such authors as Amsden (1989), Lall (1992), Pack and Westphal 
(1986), Wade (1990) and Westphal (1982 and 1990).  
18 The strong neoliberal stance was that no markets failed and that there was no role for the government apart from providing 
basic public goods and a stable setting for market driven activity. For a critique of the World Bank (1993) publication see Lall 
(1996) and for a recent restatement of the moderate neoclassical position see Noland and Pack (2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 14 
 
   
In this model, any policy intervention that affects the prices facing enterprises is by definition distorting, 
and moves society away from the optimum allocation yielded by free markets.
19 The critical assumption 
for industrial policy is the one on  learning and capability building and dropping it yields very different 
conclusions for policy (below). But showing that there may be market failures in importing and using 
technology cannot establish a case for selectivity. It is also necessary to show that such failures are 
important in practice and not theoretical curiosities, and to establish that governments can effectively 
remedy them in real life, that government failures are not necessarily more costly than market failures. It 
is argued here that both can be shown, and the transition from an admittedly simplified neoclassical 
model to a universal, timeless neoliberal policy diktat is not justified in theory, history or practice.
20 To do 
this we turn to the structuralist approach to technology in developing countries. 
3.2 The technological capability approach 
How enterprises in developing countries actually use technology is analysed by a large recent literature on 
technological capabilities.
21  The  literature  is mainly empirical but  has  its  theoretical  roots in the 
evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter (1982) and the  modern information theory  of Stiglitz.
22 It 
argues that industrial success in developing countries depends essentially on how enterprises manage the 
process of mastering, adapting and improving upon existing technologies. The process is difficult and 
prone to widespread and diffuse market failures, with have important implications for policy (see Box 1).  
Technology has strong ‘tacit’ elements that need the user to invest in new skills, routines, and technical 
and organizational information. Such  investment faces market and institutional failures whose remedies 
                                                  
19 Neoclassical economists admit the possibility of market failure arising from such textbook cases as monopoly, public goods 
and some externalities, although they tend to treat failures as special cases rather than the rule. The market failures that may call 
for selective interventions are capital market deficiencies, scale economies and externalities arising from the imperfect 
appropriability of investments in knowledge, technology, and skills. However, the admission that these theoretical possibilities 
exist does not translate into recommendations that government actually mount selective policies to overcome them (as in the 
World Bank, 1993). Moreover, the neglect of firm-level learning processes (below) means that the list of market failures remains 
incomplete — the most critical ones for developing countries are ignored. For a longer discussion see Lall and Teubal (1998).  
20 Wade, in the introduction to the forthcoming new edition of his path-breaking book of industrial policy in Taiwan, 
Governing the Market, says: “The remarkable thing about the core Washington Consensus package is the gulf between the 
confidence with which it is promulgated and the strength of supporting evidence, historical or contemporary. There is virtually no 
good evidence that the creation of efficient, rent-free markets coupled with efficient, corruption-free public sectors is even close 
to being a necessary or sufficient condition for a dynamic capitalist economy. Almost all now-developed countries went through 
stages of industrial assistance policy before the capabilities of their firms reached the point where a policy of (more or less) free 
trade was declared to be in the national interest. Britain was protectionist when it was trying to catch up with Holland. Germany 
was protectionist when trying to catch up with Britain. The United States was protectionist when trying to catch up with Britain 
and Germany, right up to the end of the World War II.20 Japan was protectionist for most of the twentieth century up to the 
1970s, Korea and Taiwan to the 1990s. Hong Kong and Singapore are the great exceptions on the trade front, in that they did 
have free trade and they did catch up—but they are city-states and not to be treated as economic countries. In Europe some 
countries abutting fast-growing centres of accumulation were also exceptions, thanks to the ‘ink blot’ effect. But by and large, 
countries that have caught up with the club of wealthy industrial countries have tended to follow the prescription of Friedrich 
List, the German catch-up theorist writing in the 1840s: “In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less 
advanced nation [read: Germany] must first be raised by artificial measures to that stage of cultivation to which the English 
nation has been artificially elevated”” (Wade, 2003). For a longer historical perspective see Reinert (1995).   
21 See Lall (1992, 1996, 2001), Westphal (2002), UNIDO (2002). 
22 In his analysis of East Asian success Stiglitz (1996) argues that “… whenever information was imperfect or markets were 
incomplete, government could devise interventions that filled in for these interventions and that could make everyone better off. 
Because information was never perfect and markets never complete, these results completely undermined the standard 
theoretical basis for relying on the market mechanism. Similarly the standard models ignored changes in technology; for a 
variety of reasons markets may under-invest in research and development … Because developing economies have 
underdeveloped (missing) markets and imperfect information and because the development process is associated with acquiring 
new technology (new information), these reservations about the adequacy of market mechanisms may be particularly relevant to 
developing countries.” P. 156, emphasis added. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 15 
 
   
require intervention. Many  interventions have to be selective because technologies differ inherently  in 
their tacit features and externalities.  Industrial success  in the developing world  –  and indeed in the 
presently developed world in its early phases of industrialization – is thus traceable to  how effectively 
governments have overcome these market and institutional failures.     
Box 1: Ten features of technological learning in developing countries 
Technological learning is a real and significant process. It is vital to industrial development, and is primarily conscious and 
purposive rather than automatic and passive. Firms using a given technology for similar periods need not be equally proficient: 
each will be at the point given by the intensity of its capability building efforts.  
Firms do not have full information on technical alternatives. They function with imperfect, variable and rather hazy knowledge of 
technologies they are using. There is no uniform, predictable learning curve for a given technology. Each faces risk, uncertainty 
and cost. Differences in learning are larger between countries at differing levels of development.  
Firms may not know how to build up the necessary capabilities — learning itself often has to be learned. In a developing country, 
knowledge of traditional technologies may not be a good base on which to know how to master modern technologies. For a 
latecomer to a technology, the fact that others have already undergone the learning process is both a benefit and a cost. It is a 
benefit in that they can borrow from the others’ experience (to the extent this is accessible). It is a cost in that they are relatively 
inefficient during the process (and so have to bear a loss if they compete on open markets). The cost and risk depend on how new 
the technology is relative to the entrant’s base of knowledge, how developed factor markets are and how fast the technology is 
changing.  
Firms cope with these uncertain conditions not by maximising a well-defined function but by developing organisational and 
managerial routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These are adapted as firms collect new information, learn from experience and 
imitate other firms. Learning is path dependent and cumulative.  
The learning process is highly technology specific, since technologies differ in their learning requirements. Some technologies 
are more embodied in equipment while others have greater tacit elements. Process technologies (like chemicals) are more 
embodied than engineering technologies (machinery or automobiles), and demand different (often less) effort. Capabilities built 
up in one activity are not easily transferable to another. Different technologies involve different breadth of skills and knowledge, 
some needing a narrow range of specialization and others a wide range.  
Different technologies have different degrees of dependence on outside sources of knowledge or information, such as other firms, 
consultants, capital goods suppliers or technology institutions.  
Capability building occurs at  all levels — shop-floor, process or product engineering, quality management, maintenance, 
procurement, inventory control, outbound logistics and relations with other firms and institutions. Innovation in the conventional 
sense of formal R&D is at one end of the spectrum of technological activity; it does not exhaust it. However, R&D does become 
important as more complex technologies are used; R&D is needed just for efficient absorption.  
Technological development can take place to different depths. The attainment of a minimum level of operational capability 
(know-how) is essential to all activity. This may not lead to the development of deeper capabilities, an understanding of the 
principles of the technology (know-why): this requires a discrete strategy to invest in deepening. The deeper the levels of 
technological capabilities aimed at, the higher the cost, risk and duration involved. It is possible for an enterprise to become 
efficient at the know-how level and stay there, but this is not optimal for its long-term capability development. It will remain 
dependent on other firms for all major improvements to its technologies, and constrained in what it can obtain and use. The 
development of know-why allows firms to select better the technologies they need, lower the costs of buying those technologies, 
realise more value by adding their own knowledge, and to develop autonomous innovative capabilities.  
Technological learning is rife with externalities and inter-linkages. It is driven by direct interactions are with suppliers of inputs 
or capital goods, competitors, customers, consultants, and technology suppliers. Others are with firms in unrelated industries, 
technology institutes, extension services, universities, industry associations and training institutions. Where information and skill 
flows are particularly dense in a set of related activities, clusters of industries emerge, with collective learning for the group as a 
whole.  
Technological interactions occur within a country and abroad. Imported technology provides the most important input into 
technological learning in developing countries. Since technologies change constantly, moreover, access to foreign sources of 
innovation is vital to continued technological progress. Technology import is not, however, a substitute for indigenous capability 
development — the efficacy with which imported technologies are used depends on local efforts. Similarly, not all modes of 
technology import are equally conducive to indigenous learning. Much depends on how the technology is packaged with 
complementary factors, whether or not it is available from other sources, how fast it is changing, how developed local capabilities 
are, and the policies adopted to stimulate transfer and deepening.  
Source: Lall (2001). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 16 
 
   
The process of gaining technological mastery  in a new setting  is not instantaneous, costless or automatic, 
even if the technology is well diffused elsewhere. It is risky and unpredictable, and the process itself may 
have to be learnt. The cost and duration of the learning process varies by the complexity and scale of the 
technology; becoming an efficient garment assembler, say, is far less costly and difficult than learning to 
make automobiles. Moreover, the process is rife with externalities: firm do not learn on their own but in 
interaction with other firms (suppliers, buyers, consultants and competitors) and institutions. And it often 
requires inputs from factor markets: physical inputs, new skills, technical information and  testing or 
trouble-shooting services, finance and new infrastructure. The costs of the process rise with the degree of 
industrial backwardness of the economy.  
Capability development can face market failures in building initial capacity and in subsequent deepening. 
Both  need support, functional and selective.  Support entails a mixture of policies apart from  infant 
industry protection.
23 Take building initial capacity in new industrial activities. Free markets may not give 
correct signals for investment in new technologies when there are high, unpredictable learning costs and 
widespread externalities. This is, in modern garb, the classic case for infant industry protection: classical 
economists clearly recognised that in the presence of such costs, an industrial latecomer faced an inherent 
disadvantage compared to those that had undergone the learning process.
24 Add to this the extra costs and 
disadvantages faced by firms in developing countries: unpredictability, lack of information, weak capital 
markets, absence of suppliers, poor support institutions and so on: exposure to full import competition is 
likely to prevent entry i nto activities with relatively difficult technologies. Yet these are the technologies 
that are likely to carry the burden of industrial development and future competitiveness.  
Why do these interventions have to be selective? Offering uniform protection to all activities makes little 
sense when learning processes and externalities differ by technology, as they inevitably  do. In some 
activities the need for protection may be minimal because the learning period is relatively brief, 
information  easy to get and externalities limited.  In  complex activities or those with widespread 
externalities, newcomers may never  enter unless measures are undertaken  to promote the activity. The 
only complex activities where investments may take place without promotion are those based on local 
natural resources, if  the resource advantage  is  sufficient to offset the  learning  costs. However,  the 
processing of some resources  calls for strong industrial capabilities and for a learning base; thus,  both 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have large resource bases but advanced processing has only taken 
root in the latter, based on decades of capability building in import-substituting regimes.  
It is important to reiterate that infant industry protection  is only part of industrial policy, and by itself can 
be harmful and ineffective. This is so for two reasons. First, protection cannot succeed if it is not offset by 
competitive pressures on firms to invest in the capability building process. In fact, by cushioning the costs 
                                                  
23 See the contributions by Wade and Lall in Wood (ed.) (2003).  
24 On the case for infant industry protection John Stuart Mill, the most powerful advocate of free trade in classical economic 
thought, says: "The only case in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when 
they are imposed temporarily (especially in a young and rising nation) in the hopes of naturalising a foreign industry, in itself 
perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country. The superiority of one country over another in a branch of production often 
arises only from having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part, or disadvantage in another, but only a 
present superiority of acquired skill and experience... But it cannot be expected that individuals should, at their own risk, or 
rather to their certain loss, introduce a new manufacture, and bear the burden of carrying on until the producers have been 
educated to the level of those with whom the processes are traditional. A protective duty, continued for a reasonable time, might 
sometimes be the least inconvenient mode in which the nation can tax itself for the support of such an experiment. But it is 
essential that the protection should be confined to cases in which there is good ground for assurance that the industry which it 
fosters will after a time be able to dispense with it; nor should the domestic producers ever be allowed to expect that it will be 
continued to them beyond the time necessary for a fair trial of what they are capable of accomplishing." Mill (1940), p. 922, 
italics added. The 19
th century saw intense debates, particularly in the US, on the need for infant industry protection, and most 
early industrializing countries used the tool extensively.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 17 
 
   
of capability building, protection removes the incentive for undertaking it. One of the reasons why 
industrial policy failed in most developing countries is precisely that they failed to  overcome this 
dilemma. But it is possible to do so, by strengthening domestic competition, setting performance targets 
and, most effectively, by forcing firms into export markets where they have to compete with best practice. 
Infant industry protection only works well where it is counterbalanced by such measures. Many such 
measures also have to be selective , since the costs of entering export markets differ by product. Thus, 
differentiated export targets, credits and subsidies were often used in East Asia.  
The second reason why  industrial policy is far more than protection is the need for coordination with 
factor markets. Firms  need many new inputs into their learning:  new skills, technical and market 
information, risk finance, or new infrastructure. Unless  factor markets  can  respond  to these needs, 
protection cannot allow them to reach competitive levels of competence. And factor market interventions 
also have to be selective as well as functional, for three reasons. First, several factor market needs are 
specific to particular activities; if they lack the information or coordination to  meet these needs, 
interventions are needed to remedy the deficiencies. For instance, the skill needs of electronics may not be 
fully foreseen by education markets,
25 or the financial needs emerging new technologies may not be 
addressed by capital markets. Second, government resources for supporting factor markets are limited, 
and allocating them among competing uses entails selectivity at a high level (say, between education and 
other uses). Third, where the government is already targeting particular sectors in product markets, factor 
markets have to be geared to those activities if the strategy is to succeed.  
The deepening of capabilities suffers similar problems. The more complex the functions to be undertaken, 
the higher the costs  involved  and the greater the factor market coordination required. Getting into 
production may be easy compared to  design, development and innovation. Neoclassical theory accepts 
that free markets (implicitly in industrial economies) may fail to ensure optimal  private  innovative 
activity because of imperfect appropriability of information. However, developing countries face an 
additional problem. It is generally easier to import foreign technologies fully packaged than to develop an 
understanding of the basic principles involved – the basis of local design and development.  
‘Internalized’ technology transfer takes the form of wholly foreign-owned direct investment. This is an 
effective and rapid  way to access new technology, but it may result in little capability acquisition in the 
host country apart from production skills.
26 The move from production to innovative activity involves a 
strategic decision that foreign investors, because of the skills and technical linkages involved, tend  to be 
unwilling to take in developing countries. While some relocation of innovative activity  is taking place 
(UNCTAD 2002), it is largely in advanced countries and a few newly-industrializing economies.  
There is, in other words, a risk of market failure in capability deepening because of the learning costs 
involved, similar to initial capability building. To ensure socially optimal allocation, it may be necessary 
to  (selectively) restrict technology imports in ‘internalized’ forms  (via FDI)  and promote those in 
                                                  
25 On the selectivity of education and training policies in East Asia, and their intimate relationship to industrial policy more 
narrowly defined, see Ashton et al. (1999). Also see Narula (2003).  
26 TNCs also have to undergo costly capability development in new locations but the costs are generally lower for them. They 
know how to go  about building capabilities, have ‘deeper pockets’, more information and better training resources. If a 
developing host country engages only in simple assembly operations, TNCs may be able to achieve competitive production 
without protection because the learning period is short and relatively predictable. However, deepening and diversification into 
more advanced activities or functions may need government support to improve the quality of local factors and suppliers and to 
induce TNCs to transfer these activities and functions. This may not involve protection if the local workforce is sufficiently 
skilled – the Singapore story. However, Singapore had to use a battery of selective interventions to attract and target TNCs and 
provide them with the factor inputs, infrastructure and incentives needed to force the pace of upgrading. FDI may reduce the need 
for interventions for capability building but cannot remove it altogether. Once countries move beyond simple processing, they 
have to provide the factors that allow TNCs to undertake complex functions efficiently.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 18 
 
   
‘externalized’ forms (licensing, equipment, imitation or OEM contracts). Over history most countries that 
have build strong local innovative capabilities have done it in local firms, often by restricting FDI 
selectively (see below). Some have done it partially by stimulating foreign investors to invest in R&D, 
but this has also involved selective interventions. Thus, it is not just interventions in trade that matter but 
also in the way in which technologies are transferred: complete openness to internalized technology 
imports may not be a good thing if it truncates the process of technological deepening and internalized 
transfers may need to be subjected to interventions to extract greater technological benefits.  
Does the globalization of production change matters? The spread of integrated systems means that many 
technologies are now only available through FDI (Radosevic, 1999). It also means that countries that get 
into the low end of sophisticated activities can  reap enormous export benefits. This makes the cost of 
restricting FDI much higher. Rapid technical change also makes it more risky to bypass global systems in 
building capabilities. While this is true, it does not demolish the case for policies to promote deepening. 
The growth of global sourcing  has made it easier to become competitive in some activities  without 
developing local capabilities. Nevertheless, local capability development remains vital for several reasons 
(taken up  later); in fact, it becomes more important because tapping globalized systems needs stronger 
capabilities and more discretionary tools.   
4. Industrialization strategies in the mature East Asian Tigers  
There was no general ‘East Asian model’. Each country had a different model within a common context 
of export orientation, sound macro management and a good base of skills. Each model reflected different 
objectives and used different interventions (though some, like support for exporters, were similar). As a 
result, each had a different pattern of industrial and export growth, reliance on FDI, technological 
capability and enterprise structure. However, for none was “getting prices right” a sufficient explanation 
of industrial success. The different objectives of the NIEs are shown in Table 2.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 19 
 
   
 
Table 2: Industrial Policy Objectives of NIEs  










Promotion  of 
Large Local 
Enterprises 
Hong Kong   None  None  Passive Open Door   None except 
technology  support 
for SMEs 
None 
Singapore   Very strong push 






started for SMEs 
Aggressive targeting 
& screening of 
TNCs, direction into 
high value-added 
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None for local firms, 
but TNCs targeted to 
increase R&D 




Taiwan   Strong push into 
capital, skill and 
technology intensive 
industry 
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raising local content 
and  subcontracting 
Screening FDI, entry 
discouraged where 




support for local 




tech development   
Sporadic: to enter 
heavy industry, 
mainly by public 
sector 
Korea   Strong push into 









of local suppliers, 
sub-contracting 
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FDI kept out unless 
necessary for 










Targeting of strategic 
technologies  
Sustained drive to 
create giant private 
conglomerates to 
internalise markets, 
lead heavy industry, 
create export brands  
Note on abbreviations: SMEs refers to small and medium enterprises, FDI to foreign direct investment, TNCs to multinational corporations, 
R&D to research and development.  






































































 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 20 
 
   
Figure 7 shows recent MVA growth for these four countries, China and industrialized  and developing 
countries for 1980 to 2000. Hong Kong stands out for its weak performance. Korea is the best performer 
among the mature Tigers, but China outshines the four (and the rest of the region).  Figure 8 shows 
manufactured export growth from 1981 to 2000, with very similar patterns except that Singapore 
marginally outperforms Korea in the 1990s. 








H Kong  Singapore  Korea  Taiwan  China  Industrialized Developing
1981-900 1990-2000
 
Hong Kong was nearest to the neoliberal ideal, combining free trade with an open door policy to FDI. 
However,  its success does not provide  many  lessons in  the virtues of free markets to other countries. 
Hong Kong had unique initial conditions and its industrial performance, after the initial spurt, was weak. 
Its initial conditions included a long entrepôt tradition, global trading links, established infrastructure of 
trade and finance, presence of large British companies (the ‘Hongs’) with immense spillovers in skills and 
information, and influx of entrepreneurs, engineers and technicians (with considerable past learning) from 
the mainland. This allowed it to launch into light export-based manufacturing: other entrepôt economies 
in the developing world  have provided similar policy environments but  not enjoyed similar competitive 
success.  Moreover,  the  colonial  government did  intervene to help industry, allocating  scarce land  to 
manufacturers and setting up strong and well-funded support institutions like the Hong Kong Productivity 
Council, an export promotion agency, a textile design centre, a technical university, and recently a 
technology park with co-financi ng for high-tech start-ups.  
The absence of  selective industrial policy, however,  constrained  the deepening and  growth of 
manufacturing  as inherited capabilities were ‘used up’. Hong Kong  started with and stayed with light 
labour-intensive activities where learning costs were relatively low. There was some progress in terms of 
product quality and diversification, but little industrial or technological deepening over time – in striking 
contrast to Singapore, a smaller entrepôt economy that pursued strong industrial policy. As a result, Hong 
Kong de-industrialized as costs rose; manufacturing now accounts for less than 5% of GDP compared to 
over 25% at the peak. Its manufacturers shifted to other countries, mainly China, and its own exports went 
into decline in the 1990s. The economy  has been growing slower than the other Tigers, and its main 
competitive advantage – providing financial and other services to the mainland – is under threat as China QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 21 
 
   
builds its own service capabilities. In any case, as far as industrial development goes, its experience does 
not convince one of the unalloyed benefits of free trade.  
Singapore used highly interventionist policies to promote and deepen industry but in a free trade setting, 
showing clearly how industrial policy can take many other forms apart from import protection. With half 
the population of Hong Kong, even higher wages and a thriving service sector, Singapore did not suffer a 
similar ‘hollowing out’ of manufacturing. Its industrial structure, with strong policy support, deepened 
steadily  over time, allowing it to sustain rapid industrial growth. It relied heavily on TNCs but, unlike 
Hong Kong, the government targeted activities for promotion and aggressively sought and used FDI as 
the tool to achieve its objectives (Wong, 2003).  
Singapore started with a base of capabilities in entrepôt trading, ship servicing and petroleum refining. 
After a spell of import substitution, it moved into export-oriented industrialisation, based overwhelmingly 
on  FDI. There was little influx of new technical and entrepreneurial know-how from China, and a weak 
tradition of local entrepreneurship. After a decade or so of light industrial activity, the government acted 
firmly to upgrade the industrial structure. It guided  TNCs to higher value-added activities, narrowly 
specialised and integrated into the ir global operations. It intervened  extensively to create the specific 
skills needed (Ashton et al., 1999), and set up public enterprises to undertake activities considered in the 
country’s strategic interest, where foreign investment was unfeasible or undesirable.  
Box 2: Singapore’s Use of FDI   
The Singapore philosophy on foreign investment is that multinationals are to be ‘tapped’ for the competitive assets 
they bring to the country. The government’s goal is to maximise learning, technological acquisition, rapid 
movement up the industrial ladder, and the skills and incomes of its working population. To this end it is willing to 
contribute capital, tax concessions, infrastructure, education and skills training, and a stable and friendly business 
environment. While the country is well integrated into international production networks in certain sectors, its 
fortunes are not tied to those of particular multinational companies, which (like local com panies) the government 
refuses to help if they are unable to compete in the rapidly changing local environment and the world market. Thus 
over time many multinational factories in Singapore have closed their doors – particularly in low-value, labour-
intensive product lines and processes like simple electronic components and consumer goods  – and shut down 
completely or relocated to neighbouring countries, with the Singapore government’s blessing. 
The decisions of MNCs about what new technologies to bring into Singapore are strongly influenced by the 
incentives and direction offered by the government. The Singapore government is the only one in the region which, 
like many governments in Western countries, gives grants to firms for complying with specified requirements. These 
are often to do with entering particular (advanced) technologies. The government supports these incentives, acting in 
consultation with MNCs (or anticipating through proactive planning) by providing the necessary skilled manpower. 
In many instances, it is the speed and flexibility of government response that gives Singapore the competitive edge 
compared with other competing host countries. In particular, the boom in investment in offshore production by 
MNCs in the electronics industry in the 1970s and the early 1980s created a major opportunity. The government 
responded by ensuring that all supporting industries, transport and communication infrastructure, as well as the 
relevant skill development programmes, were in place to attract these industries to Singapore.  
This concentration of resources helps Singapore to achieve significant agglomeration economies and hence first-
mover advantages, and has allowed it set up many advanced electronics related industries. An example is the disk-
drive industry, where all the major US disk-drive makers have located their assembly plants in Singapore. These 
industries demanded not only electronics components and PCB assembly support, but also various precision 
engineering-related supporting industries such as tool and die, plastic injection moulding, electroplating and others. 
These supporting industries have been actively promoted by the government as part of a “clustering” approach to 
ensure the competitiveness of the downstream industries.  
As labour and  land costs have risen,  the Singapore government has encouraged MNCs to reconfigure their 
operations on a regional basis, relocating the lower end operations in other countries and making Singapore their 
regional headquarters to undertake the higher end manufacturing and other functions. This has often led MNCs to 
set up regional marketing, distribution, service and R&D centres to service the ASEAN and Asia-Pacific region. To QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 22 
 
   
promote such reconfiguration, various incentives have been offered under the regional headquarters scheme, the 
international procurement office scheme, the international logistics centre scheme, and the approved trader scheme. 
There are now some 4,000 foreign firms located in Singapore, about half of them being regional headquarters. Some 
80 of these regional headquarters have an average expenditure in Singapore of around US$18 million per year 
The management of industrial policy and FDI targeting has been centralised in the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) that gave overall strategic 
direction. EDB was endowed with the authority to coordinate all activities relating to industrial 
competitiveness and FDI, and given the resources to hire qualified and well-paid professional staff 
(essential to manage discretionary policy efficiently and honestly). Over time the agency has become the 
global benchmark for FDI promotion and approval procedures. Its ability to coordinate the needs of 
foreign investors with measures to raise local skills and capabilities has also been critical – and a feature 
that many other FDI agencies lack. The government conducts periodic strategic and competitiveness 
studies to chart the industrial evolution and upgrading of the economy: the latest was published in 1998 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry). Unlike many other countries, MNC leaders are actively involved in the 
strategy formulation process and are given a strong stake in the development of the economy.  
Since its 1991 Strategic Economic Plan, the government has focused its strategy around  industrial 
clusters. The term cluster was not used to denote geographical agglomerations (though in view of the tiny 
size of the economy all industry is in fact very tightly concentrated) but inter-linked activities in a value 
chain. In the manufacturing sector the cluster program (called ‘Manufacturing 2000’), the government 
analyses the strengths and weaknesses of leading industrial clusters, and undertakes FDI promotion and 
local capability/institution building to promote their future competitiveness. One explicit objective of the 
program is to avoid the kind of industrial ‘hollowing out’ experienced by Hong Kong (and many other 
industrial countries).  
This strategy has allowed it, for instance, to become the leading centre for hard disk drive production in 
the world, with considerable local linkages with advanced suppliers and R&D institutions. In 1994, the 
government set up an S$1 billion Cluster Development Fund (expanded to S$2 billion later) to support 
specific clusters like a new wafer fabrication park. It also launched a Co-Investment Program to provide 
official equity financing for joint ventures and for strategic ventures, not just in Singapore but also 
overseas (as long as this serves its competitive interests). The EDB can  take equity stakes to support 
cluster development by addressing critical gaps and improving local enterprises.  
Such specialization, with the heavy reliance on FDI, reduced the initial need for local technological effort. 
Over time, however,  the government mounted efforts to induce  TNCs to establish R&D and foster 
innovation in local enterprises (Wong, 2003). This strategy worked fairly well, and Singapore now has the 
third highest ratio in the developing world of enterprise financed R&D in GDP, after Korea and Taiwan 
(UNIDO, 2002).  
The two larger Tigers, Korea and  Taiwan, adopted  the most  interventionist strategies, spanning  product 
markets (trade and domestic competition) as well as all factor markets (skills, finance, FDI, technology 
transfer, infrastructure and support institutions). They had a strong preference for promoting indigenous 
enterprises and for deepening local technological capabilities, and assigned FDI a secondary role to 
technology import in other forms. Their export drive was led by local firms, backed by a host of policies 
that allowed them to develop impressive technological capabilities. The domestic market was not exposed 
to free trade; a range of quantitative and tariff measures were used over time to give infant industries 
‘space’ to develop their capabilities. The deleterious effects of protection were offset by strong incentives 
(in the case of Korea, almost irresistible pressures) to export.  
Korea went much further in building heavy industry than Taiwan. To compress its entry into complex, 
scale and technology-intensive activities,  its interventions had to be far more detailed and pervasive. 
Korea relied primarily on capital goods imports, technology licensing and OEM agreements to acquire QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 23 
 
   
technology. It used ‘reverse engineering’ (taking apart and reproducing imported products), adaptation 
and own product development to build upon these arm’s length technology imports and develop its own 
capabilities (Amsden, 1989, Westphal,  1990). Its R&D expenditures are now the highest in the 
developing world, and ahead of all but a handful of leading OECD countries. Korea accounts for some 53 
percent of the developing world’s total enterprise-financed R&D (UNIDO, 2002).  
Box 3: Managing Korean Industrial Strategy 
Korean industrial targeting and  promotion was pragmatic and flexible, and developed in concert with 
private industry. Moreover, only a relatively small number of activities were supported at a given time, 
and the effects of protection were offset by strong export orientation (below). These features strongly 
differentiate its interventions from those in typical import substituting countries, where infant industry 
protection was sweeping and open-ended, non-selective, inflexible and designed without consultation 
with industry.  
One of the l eading authorities on Korean industrial policy, Larry Westphal (1997) describes it thus: 
“Since the economy’s take-off in the early 1960s, the hallmark of the government’s approach to 
developing the business sector has been its pragmatic flexibility in responding in an appropriate manner 
to changing circumstances. Several instances demonstrate this well: the means used at the outset to 
abolish the pervasive rent-seeking mentality that had been engendered by a decade of dependence on US 
foreign assistance; and the way that rampant pessimism about its growth prospects was overcome through 
sensible planning between government and business, the success of which soon created conditions that 
stimulated radical changes in the mode of economic planning.  
“Another central feature has been the government’s ability to adapt policy approaches borrowed from 
other countries. Here notable examples include the placement of the budget authority in the planning 
ministry and the entire apparatus of export promotion. But the most important characteristic of the 
government’s approach has undoubtedly been its generally non-restrictive stance. More important, where 
many other governments have constrained business activities not in line with their development priorities, 
the government has practised ‘benign neglect’ rather than repression. As a result, entrepreneurial 
initiatives have identified significant business areas that were later incorporated into the government’s 
priorities.” 
Export promotion was a compelling system to force firms into export activity. Korea’s export targeting 
system is well known. Targeting was practised at the industry, product and firm levels, with the targets set 
by the firms and industry associations in concert with the government. There were monthly meetings 
between top government officials (chaired by the President himself) and leading exporters.
27 These targets 
were also enforced by several punitive measures: access to subsidised credit and import licences; income 
tax audits; and a number of other measures of suasion, publicity and prizes. On a long-term basis, 
moreover, bureaucrats were held responsible for meeting export targets in their respective industries, and 
                                                  
27 According to Rhee  et al. (1984), “The export targets and monthly meetings provide some of the most important 
information needed to administer the Korean export drive. Perhaps the most important is the up-to-date information on export 
performance by firm, product, and market and on reasons for discrepancy between target and performance. The government also 
gets much solid information on what is going on in the world. (The firms, meanwhile, get much solid information about the 
priorities and undertakings by government). But the government has not only acquired this information. The ministries, in concert 
with the firms, have sought first to identify the problems and opportunities and to determine appropriate actions. These actions 
have been characterised by pragmatism … speed … flexibility. … This willingness to implement new policies without careful, 
deliberate planning was generally a virtue for export policy-making — primarily because the test of those policies was success in 
the international market place. Firms thus saw the flexibility and frequent adjustments in the incentive system not as 
characteristics that would create uncertainty about the automaticity and stability of that system. They saw them as part of the 
government’s long-term commitment to keep exports profitable  — a commitment made possible by the continuity of the 
government. Without such commitment, firms would have faced much more uncertainty in their export production, and exports 
would have suffered as a result.” (pp. 35-36). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 24 
 
   
had to keep in close touch with enterprises and markets. These measures were supported by regular 
studies of each major export industry, with information on competitors, technological trends, market 
conditions and so on. 
One of the pillars of Korean strategy, and one that marks it off from the other Tigers (but mirrors Japan), 
was the deliberate creation of large private conglomerates, the chaebol . The chaebol were hand-picked 
from successful exporters and were given  various subsidies and privileges, including the restriction of 
TNC entry, in return for furthering a strategy of setting up capital and technology-intensive activities 
geared to export markets. The rationale for fostering size was obvious: in view of deficient markets for 
capital, skills, technology and even infrastructure, large and diversified firms could internalise many of 
their functions. They could undertake the cost and risk of absorbing very complex technologies (without a 
heavy reliance on FDI), further develop it by their own R&D, set up world-scale facilities and create their 
own brand names and distribution networks.  
This was a costly and high-risk strategy. The risks were contained by the strict discipline imposed by the 
government:  export performance, vigorous domestic competition and deliberate interventions to 
rationalise the industrial structure. The government also u ndertook various measures to encourage the 
diffusion of technology, putting pressures on the chaebol to establish supplier networks. Apart from the 
direct interventions to support local enterprises, the government provided selective and functional support 
by building a massive technology infrastructure and creating general and technical skills. Korea today has 
the highest rate of university enrolment in the world, and produces more engineers each year than the 
whole of India. Its enrolments in technical subjects at the tertiary level come to nearly percent of its total 
population, over twice the ratio in the OECD.  
Even more striking than its creation of high level skills was its promotion of industrial R&D. Enterprise 
financed R&D in Korea as a percentage of GDP is the second highest in the world, after Sweden, and 
exceeds such technological giants as the US, Japan and Germany. Such R&D has grown dramatically in 
the past two and a half decades as a result of the promotion of the chaebol, export orientation,  incentives, 
skill availability and government collaboration. All this was an integral part of its selective industrial 
policy.  
Taiwan’s industrial policy encompassed import protection, directed credit, selectivity on FDI, support for 
indigenous skill and  technology development and strong export promotion (Wade, 2000).  While this 
resembles Korean strategy in many ways, there were important differences. Taiwan did not promote giant 
private conglomerates, nor did it attempt a similar drive into heavy industry. Taiwanese industry remained 
largely composed of SMEs, and, given the disadvantages to technological activity inherent in small size, 
it  supported  industry  by a variety of  R&D collaboration, innovation  inducements and extension 
assistance. Taiwan has probably the developing world’s most advanced system of technology support for 
SMEs, and one of the best anywhere. But it also built a large public sector in manufacturing, to set up 
facilities where private firms were unwilling or unable to do so. 
In the early years of industrialisation, the Taiwanese government attracted FDI into activities in which 
domestic industry was weak, and used a variety of means to ensure that  TNCs transferred their 
technology to local suppliers. Like Korea, Taiwan directed FDI into areas where local firms lacked world-
class capabilities. The government played a very active role in helping SMEs to locate, purchase, diffuse 
and adapt new foreign technologies. Where necessary, the government itself entered into joint ventures, 
for instance to get into technologically very difficult areas such  as semiconductors and aerospace 
(Mathews and Cho, 1999).  
Box 4: Taiwanese Industrial Targeting  
In Taiwan early trade policies had “extensive quantitative restrictions and high tariff rates [that] shielded 
domestic consumer goods from foreign competition. To take advantage of abundant labour, the 
government subsidised light industries, particularly textiles.” World Bank (1993, pp. 131-33). As import QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 25 
 
   
substitution started to run out of steam, by 1960 “ a multiple exchange rate system was replaced with a 
unitary rate, and appreciation was avoided. Tariffs and import controls were gradually reduced, especially 
for inputs to export. In addition, the Bank of Taiwan offered low-interest loans to exporters. The 
government also hired the Stanford Research Institute to identify promising industries for export 
promotion and development. On the basis of Taiwan’s comparative advantage in low-cost labour and 
existing technical capabilities, the institute chose plastics, synthetic fibres and electronic components. 
Other industries subsequently promoted included apparel, consumer electronics, home appliances, 
watches and clocks.” (ibid) 
In the 1970s, the Taiwanese government again drew upon foreign advice, now from consultants Arthur D. 
Little, to upgrade the industrial structure and enter into secondary import substitution. These interventions 
included the setting up of “capital -intensive, heavy and petrochemical industries to increase production of 
raw materials and intermediates for the use of export industries”. In the 1980s, as its light exports lost 
competitiveness, Taiwan’s government “again moved to restructure the economy. After extensive 
consultation with domestic and foreign advisors, the government decided to  focus on high-technology 
industries: information, bio-technology, electro-optics, machinery and precision instruments, and 
environmental technology industries.  
The shift to a high-technology economy necessitated the close co-ordination of industrial, financial, 
science and technology, and human resource policies.” Individual tariff rates still varied widely, with 
widespread quantitative restrictions in use: the use of these protective instruments was made conditional 
on prices moving towards international  levels in 2 -5 years. The average legal tariff rate in 1984 was as 
high as 31 per cent, higher if additional charges are added; this is higher than the 34 per cent prevalent in 
the developing world (Wade, 1990, p. 127).  
Mathews (2001) describes one of the most successful and distinctive recent tools of industrial policy used 
in Taiwan, R&D consortia.  “Unlike the case of many of the collaborative arrangements between 
established firms in the US, Europe or Japan, where mutual risk reduction is frequently the  driving 
influence, in the case of Taiwan it is technological learning, upgrading and catch-up industry creation that 
is the object of the collaborative exercises. Taiwan’s R&D consortia were formed hesitantly in the 1980s, 
but flourished in the 1990s as institutional forms were found which encourage firms to cooperate in 
raising their technological levels to the point where they can compete successfully in advanced 
technology industries. Many of these alliances or consortia are in the information technology sectors, 
covering personal computers, work stations, multiprocessors and multimedia, as well as a range of 
consumer products and telecommunications and data switching systems and products. But they have also 
emerged in other sectors such as automotive engines, motor cycles, electric vehicles, and now in the 
services and financial sector as well. Several such alliances could be counted in Taiwan in the late-1990s, 
bringing together firms, and public sector research institutes, with the added organizational input of trade 
associations, and catalytic financial assistance from government. The alliances form an essential 
component of Taiwan’s national system of innovation.  
“Taiwan’s high technology industrial success rests on a capacity to leverage resources and pursue a strategy of rapid catch-up. Its 
firms tap into advanced markets through various forms of contract manufacturing, and are able to leverage new levels of 
technological capability from these arrangements. This is an advanced form of “technological  learning”, in which the most 
significant players have not been giant firms (as in Japan or Korea), but small and medium-sized enterprises whose 
entrepreneurial flexibility and adaptability have been the key to their success. Underpinning this success are the efforts of public 
sector research and development institutes, such as Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). Since its founding 
in 1973 ITRI and its laboratories have acted as a prime vehicle for the leveraging of advanced technologies from abroad, and for 
their rapid diffusion or dissemination to Taiwan’s firms... This cooperation between public and private sectors, to overcome the 
scale disadvantages of Taiwan’s small firms, is a characteristic feature of the country’s technological upgrading strategies, and 
the creation of new high technology sectors such as semiconductors. 
“It is Taiwan’s distinctive R&D consortia that demonstrate most clearly the power of this public-private cooperation, in one 
successful industry intervention after another. Taiwan’s current dominance of mobile (laptop) PCs for example, rests at least in 
part on a public-private sector led consortium that rushed a product to world markets in 1991. Taiwan’s strong performance in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 26 
 
   
communications products such as data switches, which are used in PC networks, similarly rests on a consortium which worked 
with Taiwan’s public sector industry research organization, ITRI, to produce a switch to match the Ethernet standard, in 1992/93. 
When IBM introduced a new PC based on its PowerPC microprocessor, in June 1995, Taiwan firms exhibited a range of 
computing products based on the same processor just one day later. Again this achievement rested on a carefully nurtured R&D 
consortium involving both IBM and Motorola, joint developers of the PowerPC microprocessor, as external parties. Taiwan is 
emerging as a player in the automotive industry, particularly in the expanding China market, driven by its development of a 1.2 
litre 4-valve engine. Again, this is the product of a public-private collaborative research endeavour involving three companies, 
which have now jointly created the Taiwan Engine Company to produce the product. Thus, the R&D consortium is an inter-firm 
organizational form that Taiwan has adapted to its own purposes as a vehicle for catch-up industry creation and technological 
upgrading. The micro-dynamics of the operation of these alliances or consortia, is therefore a matter of some substantial interest.” 
Sources: Lall (1996), Mathews (2001), World Bank (1993). 
This outline of industrial policy in the mature Tigers leads to the following conclusions:  
Selective as well as functional interventions played vital roles in the industrial and technological 
development  of the most dynamic economies in the developing world (Hong Kong is the odd one out 
since its story is largely one of truncated industrial development).  
Each mixed selective and functional policies in each area of intervention. There  is thus no  reason to 
partition policy into these categories: any effective policy has elements of both.  
The extent of technological deepening in the three Tigers is directly related to their selective interventions 
in industry. Those who  argue that intervention was irrelevant to  their industrial success show a lack of 
understanding of the real capability building processes underlying industrialization.  
Governments  in  these Tigers  showed  the  ability to devise and implement complex interventions 
effectively. In  Korea and Taiwan,  the two that used trade interventions , export-orientation imposed a 
strict discipline on both industry and governments. In Singapore, trade openness and the need to attract 
and retain FDI did the same.  
In all three, government capabilities improved over time, with growing levels of skill, remuneration and 
insulation allowing bureaucrats to operate efficiently and autonomously.
 28  
The nature and impact of interventions differed according to government objectives. The failures were 
addressed by different policies, reflecting location, size, history, culture and political economy. 
FDI was treated differently by each of the countries and so played  varying  roles in  technology 
development. Those that wanted to promote  indigenous technological deepening had to intervene to 
restrict foreign entry and to guide their activities and maximise the spillovers. Those that chose to rely on 
TNCs and upgrade within their global production structure had to target investors, guide their allocation 
and induce them to set up more complex functions.  
The options and compulsions applicable to the larger economies, with greater scope for internal 
specialisation and local content as well as better established indigenous enterprises, were different from 
those open to small states with weak indigenous entrepreneurship and a tiny internal market. Given the 
need to spread technological development more widely, the former had to take more direct steps to assist 
local firms. 
Finally, the contrast between the success of industrial policy in the Tigers and its failures elsewhere 
suggests that there  is  no  justification for the  general  Washington consensus case against  selective 
interventions. It shows instead that the outcome depends not on whether governments intervene but how 
                                                  
28 There was no ‘super-bureaucracy’ in East Asia, and the process of building administrative competence was slow and 
halting. It often focused on the critical operational parts of the government rather than covering the whole apparatus. Thus, there 
are important transferable lessons on improving government capabilities from the Tigers – it is difficult to argue that their ability 
to mount industrial policy was unique and unrepeatable. See Evans (1998) and Cheng et al. (1998).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 27 
 
   
they do so. On ‘how to intervene’, the differences between typical import-substituting strategies and those 
used in the Tigers lay in such things as:  
Selectivity  (picking a few activities at a time) rather than promoting all industrial activities 
indiscriminately and in an open-ended way 
Picking activities and functions that offered significant technological benefits and linkages 
Forcing early  entry into world markets,  using  exports as to discipline and monitor both  bureaucrats and 
enterprises 
Giving the lead role in productive activity to private enterprises but using public enterprises as needed to 
fill gaps and enter exceptionally risky areas.  
Investing massively in skill creation, infrastructure and support institutions, all carefully coordinated with 
interventions in product markets 
Using selectivity in FDI help  build local capabilities (by restricting FDI or imposing conditions on it) or 
to tap into dynamic, high technology value chains 
Centralizing strategic decision making in competent authorities who could take an economy-wide view 
and enforce policies on different ministries.  
Improving the quality of bureaucracy and governance, collecting huge amounts of relevant information 
and learning lessons from technological leaders 
Ensuring policy flexibility and  learning, so that mistakes could be corrected  en route, and involving 
private sector in strategy formulation and implementation (Lall and Teubal, 1998). 
The list could be  longer but  it  suffices to  show  that there are many ways  to design  and implement 
industrial policy. The analysis offers important lessons on what to do now. There are also many levels of 
selectivity, and adopting ‘industrial policy’ does not mean that the country has to copy the comprehensive 
and detailed interventions used in Korea or Singapore. In fact, the new setting may provide a case for 
lower degrees of selectivity in some areas. At the same time, the rigours imposed by globalization and 
technical change may well strengthen the case for more intervention in others.  
The mistakes of some industrial polic ies should not be allowed to overshadow the success of others. The 
evidence on the benefits of their effective use is overwhelming (and stretches so far back in history, well 
beyond the post-war period covered here), and that on the effects of the alternative (passive and rapid 
liberalization)  is  very  disappointing  for  countries with weak capabilities. To insist on the difference 
between selective and functional interventions and to condemn the former outright seems to fly in the face 
of theory and evidence – it carries the hallmarks of ideology.   
5. Industrial policy for the new era 
What difference do  technical change and globalization make to the policies that developing countries 
need to promote industrialization? To start with, we abstract from the rules of the game.  
Technical change:  The rapid spread of information technology, the shrinking of economic distance and 
the skill  and institutional  needs of  new  technologies have made the competitive environment more 
demanding. Competition arises faster and with greater vehemence and immediacy. Minimum entry levels 
in terms of skill, competence, infrastructure and ‘connectivity’ are higher. Specialized education  is more 
important and technology support more essential. All these raise the need for support of learning by  local 
enterprises. Low wages matter, but over time they matter less in most activities, particularly for unskilled 
labour. Only the possession of natural resources gives an independent competitive advantage, but only for 
its extraction; subsequent processing also needs competitive capabilities.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 28 
 
   
The essential  policy needs of capability building have not changed much. They are direct – the infant 
industry  case to provide ‘space’ for enterprises to master new technologies and skills without incurring 
enormous  and  unpredictable losses  – and  indirect, to ensure that skill, capital,  technology  and 
infrastructure markets meet their needs. There is also a need to coordinate learning across enterprises and 
activities, when these are linked in the production chain and imports cannot substitute effectively for local 
inputs. At the same time, technical change makes it necessary to  provide more access to international 
technology markets; it also makes it more difficult to anticipate which activities are likely to succeed. The 
information needs of industrial policy rise in tandem with technological change and complexity.  
Does the  greater  complexity of technology make  selectivity  unfeasible? Not necessarily. Detailed 
targeting of technologies, products or enterprises may be more difficult because of the pace of change, but 
targeting at higher levels is feasible – and more necessary. Technological  progress may  actually make 
industrial policy easier in some respects at the right level. Information on technological trends and 
markets is more readily available. More is known about the policies adopted by the successful countries, 
and their progress – and that of competitors – is easier to monitor.
29  
The  neoliberal  alternative, leaving  capability development  to free market forces, is  hardly more 
promising. It can result in slow and truncated technological development, with gaps between countries 
rising. Some upgrading  does  take place over time, but it  is likely to be slower and  more limited than 
without promotion. Given  the speed at which technologies are  changing  and  path-dependence and 
cumulativeness in capability building, it can lead  to  latecomers being mired  in  low growth  traps from 
which market forces cannot extract them.  
With weak local capabilities, industrialization  has to be more dependent on  FDI. It is difficult to see, 
however,  how  FDI  can  drive industrial  growth in  many parts of  the developing world without the 
development of local capabilities, for several reasons: 
FDI tends to  concentrate in technology and marketing intensive activities where enterprises can develop 
ownership assets. It  does not cover large areas of manufacturing with mundane skill, branding and 
technological requirements  – the heartland of industrial growth in latecomers. In countries with 
reasonable industrial sectors and liberal FDI p olicies, foreign affiliates account for one-third to half of 
MVA; the rest is handled by local enterprises. If these are not capable, the industrial sector cannot sustain 
lopsided growth in the long term. 
Attracting  manufacturing FDI  into complex activities (beyond simple resource extractive and labour-
intensive activities) needs strong local capabilities,  without which TNCs cannot launch efficient 
operations. Thus, local and foreign capabilities complement each other.  
Retaining an industrial base with a strong foreign presence needs rapidly rising capabilities as wages rise 
and skill demands change.  
                                                  
29 As Lall and Teubal (1998) note, “Technology policy is an art rather than a science (there is an irreducible element of 
judgement), given the characteristics of technological development and the uncertainty inherent in any choice. Frequently, any 
one of several choices can work: what is important is not to identify the unique ‘equilibrium’ but to assemble a smaller set of 
‘reasonable’ choices and implement them comprehensively and systematically. Since mistakes are inevitable (as with firms), the 
government has to be flexible and responsive to evolving characteristics  – policy has to allow for its own  learning and 
adjustment” (p. 1381). Moreover, “Successful technology policy has to be systemic. A technology development programme has 
to be dovetailed with the improvement of the education and training systems, as well as with the provision of technology support 
and capital. When the supporting system is incomplete and leads to high learning costs, firms in priority areas have to be helped 
to bear those costs, for instance by giving temporary protection against import competition… It is possible to  target entire 
categories of nuclei for promotion, such as clusters or sectors or generic technologies. An example may be Japanese promotion of 
products with high income elasticities of demand” (ibid).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 29 
 
   
FDI is attracted increasingly to efficient agglomerations or clusters of industrial activity, again calling for 
strong local capabilities.  
The cumulative nature of capabilities means that once FDI takes root in particular locations and global 
sourcing systems become established, it becomes more difficult to newcomers to break in, particularly in 
the more complex activities and functions. First mover advantages, in other words, mean that late-
latecomers face increasing entry costs – without strong local capabilities they will find it difficult to 
overcome these costs.   
It is also difficult to see how host countries that have FDI can tap its potential fully without using time-
honoured strategies like local content rules, incentives for deepening technologies and functions, 
inducements to export and so on. Admittedly, performance requirements have been deployed inefficiently 
in many countries, but, as with infant industry protection, they have also been used very effectively. 
Among the most assiduous users of incentives for technology transfer and innovation are the advanced 
industrial countries. It is a puzzling dilemma of the current policy environment that it recommends that 
countries open up to FDI while removing policy tools to overcome uncertainty, information failures, 
learning costs and so on.  
Globalization: 'Globalization' is used here narrowly to mean the fragmentation of processes and functions 
across countries.  Fragmentation  allows  countries  to develop competitive activities in niches  – one 
component or process – and  reach huge markets in ways not possible  some years  ago. The capability 
needs are narrower and more specialized than those in traditional forms of industrial specialization. TNCs 
can  transfer the ‘missing elements’ of technology, skills and capital needed to complement local 
capabilities if they see a competitive product at the end of the investment. In the process, they develop 
new capabilities – mainly production skills – in the affiliates to the extent needed for efficient production. 
The spread of integrated systems makes it more difficult and risky to take the autonomous route of Japan, 
Korea or Taiwan. It is much easier for countries to attract particular segments of TNC activity and build 
upon that rather than to develop local capabilities to match those of affiliates. In any case, local firms 
would find it extremely hard to enter export markets in a major way, emulating the earlier example of 
OEM contractors from Korea and Taiwan. All the later entrants into globalized systems, from Malaysia 
and Thailand to Mexico and Costa Rica, have gone the FDI route. As FDI regimes are more liberal today, 
TNCs are less willing to part with technologies to independent firms that might become competitors.  
In sum,  globalization does not do away with the need for all selective industrial policies; it only reduces 
the scope and raises the potential cost of some. FDI is not, as noted, a replacement for local enterprises or 
capabilities – after a certain level of development the two are complementary. Strong local capabilities 
raise the possibility of attracting high value systems and of capturing skill and technology spillovers from 
them; these capabilities  need selective policies. Moreover, attracting export-oriented FDI  increasingly 
requires selective promotion and targeting. The most effective targeting is now undertaken by investment 
promotion agencies in advanced economies (Loewendahl, 2001).  
But there is a more fundamental issue:  how far can globalized production systems spread across the 
developing world and how much do they realistically offer to industrial development in many poor, low 
capability countries? After all, fragmented production is characteristic of only some industries in which 
production processes can be readily separated in technological and geographical terms, and where 
differences in labour cost significantly affect the location of each process. In low technology industry, it is 
strong in clothing, footwear, sports goods and toys; in high technology industry, it is strong in electronics; 
in medium technology industry, it is strong in automobiles but the weight of the product and its high basic 
capability requirements mean that it only goes to a few proximate, relatively industrialized locations. This 
leaves a broad range of industries in which FDI and exports are not driven by global production systems.  
Where such systems exist, they are likely to  continue relocating to  lower wage countries in only some 
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the abolition of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (formerly the Multi-Fibre A rrangement) next 
year raises the risk that garment production will shift back to East Asia rather than spread further to poor 
countries. However, wages are rising rapidly in the Chinese coastal areas that provide the bulk of garment 
exports, and infrastructure in the interior is still poor. Major new export platforms may be located in other 
countries, like Vietnam or Cambodia and South Asia, and Chinese enterprises may themselves become 
outward investors to find the most economical sites.  How far they will encompass least developed 
countries in Africa or medium income ones in LAC or MENA is difficult to say. It is indicative that other 
labour-intensive systems that do not have trade quotas driving location  – footwear, toys and the like – 
have not looked for production bases in these regions.  
 In high technology production systems like electronics the picture is different. Entry levels are higher 
than in the late 1960s when  the  industry  first  sought  cheap  labour in  Southeast Asia. Production 
techniques have advanced and grown more capital intensive. Manufacturing systems have ‘settled down’ 
in their new locations, with established facilities, logistics, infrastructure and support institutions. If these 
systems grow, they are likely to cluster around established sites rather than spread to new, less-developed 
ones. Entry by newcomers is possible, of course: China is the obvious case – but most poor countries lack 
the industrial  capability,  size, location and other advantages of China. And most cannot use selective 
industrial policy to attract hi-tech FDI and induce it to source local inputs and skills in the way that China 
still does (and is likely to continue doing after WTO rules come into play). The prospects of complex 
global production systems spreading to most of Africa, LAC, South Asia or MENA are fairly dim. So far 
only South Africa, India and Morocco seem to offer some potential.  
It is possible that systems will emerge in other industries to catalyze the growth of FDI-driven production 
in new sites.  As far as poor countries go, these are likely to be i n resource-based activities. However, 
these are likely to be fairly  demanding in terms of skills, technology and infrastructure.   Given the 
advantages of clustering in locations with established capabilities, new systems are likely to congregate in 
successful countries rather than to poorer ones without a good  industrial base.
30 This chicken and egg 
problem can only be resolved by selective policy to build the base.  Industrialization in the developing 
world continues to  face many of the same constraints that it did before integrated systems. The need to 
foster the development of local capabilities remains the ‘bottom line’ and globalization offers an 
alternative route only in some activities, to some countries and even to these only for some time.  
5.1 The desirable, the practical and the permissible   
The new formal rules of the game under WTO aegis do not prohibit all selective interventions, only those 
that affect trade. However, there are other forces making for liberalization that are not formal and  rule-
based: structural adjustment programmes, bilateral trade and investment agreements and pressures by rich 
countries. Taken together, these constitute a formidable web of constraints on the ability of governments 
to mount industrial polic y. As noted at the start, constraints may be useful.  They may prevent the  more 
egregious forms of intervention that led in the past to inefficiency, rent-seeking and technological sloth. 
They  are  also  beneficial to  countries that have already  developed  strong  capabilities behind protective 
barriers and should exploit them in competitive production: countries like India, Brazil or China should 
accelerate liberalization,  if  they can  combine this  with a strategy to restructure activities and enter 
promising new activities.  
                                                  
30 Outside manufacturing, IT based services offer different prospects. Software, data entry, call centres and the like can in 
theory be located in any country regardless of its industrial base. However, so far the main IT service exporters in the developing 
world have been relatively industrialized, and the learning base for complex activities like software has been domestic industry. 
Agglomeration forces are also very strong, and it remains to be seen whether liberal policies will suffice to spread IT activities 
over the developing world. At the very least, targeted skill creation, infrastructure development and FDI promotion policies 
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At this time, the main forms of selectivity  permitted  pertain to  skill formation, technology support, 
innovation financing, FDI promotion and  targeting, infrastructure development for IT,  and all  general 
subsidies that do not affect trade performance. These tools – and some not in  line with the spirit of the 
rules (US tariff protection on steel, for instance) – are all used vigorously by the industrialized countries. 
Most semi-industrial countries also use them,  but the  less-developed countries generally do not  (on 
weaknesses in technology support in SSA, for instance, see Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002).  
The critical issues  facing the development community in industrialization  are:  Is  the degree of policy 
freedom left to developing countries sufficient to promote healthy industrial development?
31 If East Asia 
offers lessons for industrial policy, will the new environment allow them to be implemented? Without 
strong policy intervention, will persistence with liberalization suffice to drive industrialization?  
The answer to all these questions  is ‘probably not’. The permissible tools are probably  not enough to 
foster the rapid and achievable development of technological capabilities. They will force poor countries 
with weak local industrial bases to become over-dependent on  FDI to drive industrial and capability 
development. This cannot, for  the  reasons given, meet  a major part of the needs of sustainable 
industrialization. Even countries fortunate enough to plug into some global production systems can only 
do so as providers of the low-level  labour services; subsequent deepening  may  be  held back by 
constrictions on selective capability development. For developing countries that have a capability base the 
rules can  deter strategic diversification into new technologies and activities. They can prevent newly 
industrializing economies from diversifying into advanced activities where entry is particularly risky and 
costly.  
In general, the rules and pressures for liberalization  threaten to  freeze comparative advantage in areas 
where capabilities  exist  at the time of liberalization, yielding a relatively short period of competitive 
growth before the stock is ‘used up’. Subsequent upgrading of competitiveness is likely to be slower than 
if governments had the tools to intervene selectively.  Returning to the East Asia/LAC comparison, the 
current policy regime is likely to prevent  most of Latin America  from emulating the  growth and 
dynamism of the Tigers. And other developing regions are likely to fare even worse if the accept the rules 
and renounce all policy in favour of market-driven allocation.     
While l ocal capabilities matter more than ever in an era of globalization,  this does not mean  that all 
developing countries try to  replicate the  selective  policies  used  by  Tigers like  Singapore,  Korea or 
Taiwan. What it means is drawing lessons on selectivity from their experience and adapting them to local 
needs and circumstances. This should be done in the following stages. 
The first stage of a desirable international policy regime would be to provide policy makers with an 
objective and detailed analysis of what successful countries did to build industrial capabilities. This is not 
the case today; on the contrary, the system denies that industrial policy has any role to play.  
The  second  would be  to create greater policy space for industrial policy. The move to wholesale 
liberalization  has great momentum, but rules are man-made and can easily be reversed if a consensus 
exists. Yet, despite all the public breast-beating about growing poverty,  marginalization,  Millennium 
Development Goals and the like, the assumption on which international  development is based  is that the 
industrial sector will develop best under the new rules – only further liberalization is necessary.  
                                                  
31 What is ‘sufficient’ is of course largely subjective. Some may consider it ‘sufficient’ that poor countries do not industrialize 
and stay specialized in primary activities: market fundamentalism sanctifies market-determined outcomes, and any deviation 
from these, even if it leads to faster growth, is by definition wrong, unhealthy or distorting. Others may consider it ‘sufficient’ if 
countries are able to raise industrial and manufactured export growth to, say, 5 percent over an extended period, and still others 
may set the benchmark at the record of East Asia. The precise objective does not matter as much as the acceptance that industrial 
development has to be accelerated and that needs policy intervention.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 32 
 
   
The third stage would be to help develop the capability to mount industrial policy. The final recourse of 
the neoliberal, when confronted with the unanswerable theoretical case for selective interventions, is that 
it is impossible for governments to design and implement them. But there is a large body of case material 
showing that such interventions can work (and that neoliberal solutions do not): government failure is, in 
other words, not inevitable. What is needed as an integral part of industrial policy is the building of the 
administrative competence, information and insulation that governments need. That government 
capabilities and governance can be strengthened is not in doubt (if it is, there would no scope for any kind 
of development policy).  
The fourth  stage would  be to help devise strategies appropriate to each country. Creating more policy 
space and strengthening government capabilities should not mean returning to the bad old days of import 
substitution. It should be used for careful and flexible policy making, with clear targets and checks aimed 
at specific forms of technology development. This would be the most difficult step, since it requires the 
rich countries not only to admit that industrial policy has a role and to allow poor countries to use such 
policy but to actively help them in designing and implementing it.  
If  this seems a forlorn hope at this time,  consider  the alternative  of  persisting with  wholesale 
liberalization. This would support the strong and penalize the weak, on the assumption that globalization 
will by itself be sufficient to catalyze industrial development. This does not appear very promising. And 
there is enough evidence that well-used industrial policy can transform economic prospects.  The 
development community has to accept this, provide the ‘space’ for such policy and help  countries to 
mount such policy, not deny its usefulness and practicability.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS111  Page 33 
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